Negotiating Strategic Alliance Partnerships

Strategic alliance negotiations have become a vital part of the portfolios of many companies. In an era of rapid technological change, an altering competitive landscape, and the globalization of competition, many more companies are choosing to partake in alliances. Frequently the decision to join in alliances is not one of the companies own choosing. With their competitors forging alliances, firms are often faced with fewer choices other than that of forming alliances to negate the potential advantage of their rivals.

That said, studies reveal that the failure rate in alliances occurs anywhere from 30-70%.[i] The high failure rates are mirrored in the collapse of some alliances that have gained widespread publicity. The failure of the Meiji- Borden alliance, the collapse of Cornings alliance with Vitro, and the early termination of Corning's alliance with Nestle are some prominent examples of alliance failures.[ii]

There is no easy why for why a negotiated partnership falls apart. Some fail because of the incompatibility of the goals between the partners.[iii] Others are unable to navigate cultural differences among partner firms. [iv]Still, others collapse because of the opportunistic behaviour by their partner or the inability to effectively coordinate their activities.[v] Yet others are the victims of changing environmental conditions that call into question the reason for forming an alliance. Still others suffer from the challenge of forming an alliance with a partner who may be their competitor.[vi]

Given the diversity of the underlying reasons for failed partnerships, it is perhaps understandable why managers often consider alliances as an organizational form that maximises rather than minimizes ambiguity. Ambiguity is inherent to alliances as are numerous variables that often come into play. These variables mutually influence each other and their interaction often occurs in an environment that is far from benevolent. For example, where the partners' objectives are, or are perceived to be dissimilar, they may take actions that may surprise their partner. This, in turn, may cause the offended partner to question the motivations of their partner. This will certainly undermine trust and make cooperation among the partners exceedingly difficult. The collapse of the alliance between Borden and Meiji milk illustrates this dynamic quite clearly.The ambiguity that is a trait of any alliance is not a one time event by any means, although the causes of ambiguity may clearly be unique at different phases of alliance evolution. Joint venture partnerships go through the phases of;

• Formation,
• Operation, and
• Outcome [vii]

Each of these phases presents distinct problems about managing ambiguity. At the formation stage the alliance partners agree on forging an alliance and proceed to make their agreement operational. At the operation stage the alliance starts its operations such as a marketing arrangement, an R&D partnership, or a manufacturing one. Finally, at the outcome stage alliance partners must make the decision whether to proceed with the alliance or terminate the partnership, be it premature or otherwise.

I propose that at the formation stage the underlying ambiguity surrounds the terms of the agreement. The potential partners to the alliance are obviously motivated to get the best possible agreement, but they also clearly recognize that they cannot push their partner too far, or there will be no alliance. The crucial question is:

What should be the right balance between assertiveness and acceptance?

The ambiguity in international alliances may also be fostered by cultural differences. Although these differences are always present, they are likely to be particularly significant at the start of the interaction. Partners may not understand each other or may incorrectly understand each other. They may or may not feel at ease with the negotiation tactics used by their partners. For example, the relationship oriented negotiation strategy, so characteristic of Asian and Latin American cultures, may not be well received with the time conscious North Americans. Similarly, the Asians or the Latin Americans may be displeased with the assertiveness of the North Americans which may cause them to lose face. Without a cultural interpreter or a mediator present, misunderstandings may well be commonplace under these conditions.

The operational stage is often marred by managerial ambiguity. A lack of clarity may exist as to how decisions are going to be made or the basis for these decisions. Differences may exist in how effectively the partners communicate or share information and make the situation worst. If partners distrust each other they may not fully trust the information that is being provided and surely this can only complicate matters. If these problems persist they may result in an unfavourable process and/or outcome discrepancies. This is most certainly an unwelcome development as it is likely to lessen their trust and diminish the psychological commitment of the venture partners. viii Process discrepancies mean that the partners are discontented with the manner in how they interact with each other. This could include;

• information sharing,
• putting in the required effort,
• and/or making decisions in a timely way.

Outcome discrepancies mean that at the operational stage the alliance has failed to generate results that are satisfactory to one or all of the partners. The marketing strategy may not have yielded the desired results or slow the progress in product development. Obviously, these negative outcomes will put pressure on managers to either reverse course or embark on radical changes to revive the venture.

Lastly, at the outcome stage the managers are faced with the issue of evaluative ambiguity. This takes on particular relevance when the alliance has not fared well. The alliance partner or partners must now decide whether they wish to pursue the alliance. When should they pull the plug on the venture? What current alternatives are available to restructure or renegotiate the venture? How will their partner reply to their decision? If the alliance is with a partner from Asian or Latin American cultures, would the decision to exit be perceived as a face loss for the culturally distant partner?

If ambiguity is such a fundamental characteristic feature of strategic partnerships how should managers seek to deal with it? This is the central theme which we will be pursuing in this article. Our basic message is a simple one. While ambiguity cannot be eliminated, managers can learn to deal with it better. The ability to cope with ambiguity means that managers pay heed to both structural and the behavioural aspects of the alliance. By the structural aspect, I mean the contractual terms and the governance arrangements surrounding the alliance. By the behavioural aspect I am referring to the manner in how managers interact with each other. The two are clearly not independent of each other, but that said, they uniquely impact the function of a partnership alliance.

The structural dimension will establish whether the managers approach alliance management with a cooperative or a competitive frame of mind. On the other hand, the behavioural interaction will determine whether they amplify or minimize the cooperative or the competitive frame in how they manage an alliance.

Our central message is simply this:

The effective management of structural and the behavioural dimension of the alliance necessitates that managers learn to negotiate effectively. If managers are able to negotiate effectively they may both succeed in minimizing ambiguity and or may be able to cope with it more creatively. I will propose negotiation strategies that may assist alliance managers to manage ambiguity effectively at all phases of alliance evolution.

Managing ambiguity: The role of negotiations

(a) Forming a strategic alliance

The negotiations involved in the forming of a strategic alliance are by no means easy. Although all negotiations incur the common but fundamental tension between value creation and value claiming these tensions are exaggerated in alliances for several reasons. ix

1) Alliances are often temporary arrangements. This means that while the partners are clearly aware of the advantages of an alliance, they are uncertain how long these benefits might continue. Clearly, this is likely to make the partners wary of each other.

2) Many alliances are formed between companies who are potential competitors. Partners are often wary of sharing information, lest they surrender the basis for their competitive advantage. Cultural barriers also often aggravate the problem of finding common ground.

3) Many alliances involve multiple partners. If negotiations are difficult with just two partners, the difficulty is obviously more magnified when more than two parties are involved. All of this then contributes to amplifying the ambiguity in the alliance. The question is:

How should alliance negotiators tackle this problem?

(1) Learn to accept ambiguity

Strategic alliance negotiators must learn to become comfortable with ambiguity. It is understandable that negotiators are often uneasy with ambiguity because it diminishes their sense of control. It is not evident to them whether they will succeed in concluding a negotiation, or the time that it will take to broker the agreement. It may not even be clear to the negotiator if the negotiated deal is the most suitable one for the company concerned.

Although we are all understandably wary of ambiguity, accepting ambiguity can bestow on negotiators a number of noteworthy advantages. A high tolerance for ambiguity may help the negotiators relax and gain confidence when interacting with their counterparts. A more positive negotiation climate will result and may elicit favourable reactions from their counterparts.

Secondly, if ambiguity cannot be avoided, why not simply embrace it? Acceptance of ambiguity may permit negotiators to turn ambiguity to their advantage. Ambiguity suggests that nothing is written in stone. There is room for manoeuvring. In other words, ambiguity may promote flexibility. Negotiators who become at ease with ambiguity can more readily capitalize on the benefits of flexibility.

Lastly, ambiguity is also an effectual tool for the promotion of harmony among the parties. Ambiguity implies that contested issues can remain hidden until the parties are prepared to more forcefully address them. This is an advantage because it allows the negotiators to buttress their relationship before dealing with more difficult issues.

(2) Seek to develop a common vision for the alliance

Scholars have often made a distinction between interest based and positional based bargaining. x The former is integrative in character because it seeks to integrate the underlying interests of all of the parties. By contrast, positional based bargaining negotiators often stakes out unyielding positions leading to either an unsatisfactory solution or no solution. Although interest based bargaining has much to recommend to it, it may be inadequate in shaping an agreement that will withstand all of the turbulence that an alliance may face.

This is so for two reasons:

• Interest based bargaining assumes that people are conscious of what their actual interests. And yet, when ambiguity prevails, negotiators may either perceive their interests wrongly or may have no clear idea of what their fundamental underlying interests are.
• Ambiguity may make it more difficult for alliance negotiators to directly deal with interest based bargaining. The reason is that the negotiators may not fully know what their overall interests are and/or may be reluctant to reveal them. Given these difficulties it is crucial the negotiators strive to create a common vision for the alliance. This means that the alliance partners have a coherent idea about what the alliance is all about. They must employ and pursue strategies that will allow the alliance to achieve its goals. It is only within the framework of this broad understanding that the partners can meaningfully identify their interests and act upon them.

(3) Go with the flow

Given the intrinsic ambiguity of alliances one can foresee that negotiations will not necessarily proceed in a step wise or a linear sequence. Progress may be slowed and when all hope appears lost, a ray of hope may begin to appear. There are so many variables at play here. This could include the conflicting and often shifting strategic objectives of the partner firms; to sudden changing environmental conditions; to complex intra organizational politics. This illustrates that these negotiations are anything but simple.

Wheeler & Morris have remarked that even simple negotiations are anything but simple. They noted that even a simple negotiation can unfold in many different ways. xi They observed that small events can at times break or make a negotiation. There is, as they put it, the “fog of negotiation", which would make everything possible as well as impossible at the same time. xii.

The important implication here is that negotiators should be prepared for the fact that they cannot control everything. Indeed, to expect the opposite would be unwise, and may prevent negotiators from attaining their negotiation objectives. I do not wish to imply that a negotiator should not strive to bring their own sense of direction to the negotiation; it is only to suggest, on the contrary that they must realize the limitations of their control. It is imperative that negotiators exhibit a high level of creativity at this stage, because in many ways, this represents their best hope for salvation. In practical terms this means that negotiators should not prematurely accept or reject proposals coming from the other party. Careful reflection is an absolute precondition to achieve success. While that may not always be adequate, it is essential.

(b) Operating a strategic alliance

Assuming that the strategic joint partnership has been successfully negotiated the managers will now have to ensure that the alliance runs smoothly. There are several reasons which may mitigate a successful transition.

1) First, there is the possibility that the partner(s) behave opportunistically. This means that they may either not put in the necessary effort and/or may try to access their partner's technologies in an illegitimate manner. This is obviously the worst of managerial conduct and will understandably invite swift retaliation. Alternatively, if the partnership that has been founded does not conform to the reality of the existing circumstances, this will also act against the formation of a successful alliance.

2) It may also not be easy for partners to surmount cultural barriers. Culture frequently affects how people share information, how they make decisions, define problems, and/or the means by which partners attempt to manage conflict. xiii. A good example of a partnership which experienced severe cultural problems is the Volvo- Renault alliance. xiv. Although cultural problems were not the only problems that led to the demise of the alliance they certainly did play their part. The French and the Swedish cultures are unique. Some earlier work had suggested that the Swedish felt more at ease working with their British or German colleagues than they did working with their French colleagues. xv

3) Finally, any alliance has to overcome the basic problem where the employees of the alliance may not fully identify with it. xvi. There are several reasons underlying this dilemma:

• The employees of the partner firms who are absorbed into the alliance may not be suitably compensated for their new assignment.
• They may also recognize that their ultimate future career progress lies within the parent company and not within the partnership.
• Top management may neglect to build a new culture in the alliance. The result is that the employees may seek to return to their earlier patterns of behaviour within the alliance.
• There is also the added problem that the joint venture may be seen very differently by top level managers, alliance level managers, and functional specialists. xvii Each of these managers has their own distinct concerns. Reconciling them may not be that easy. Thus while top level managers are concerned about the strategic significance of the alliance, alliance managers are concerned that their partner behaves fittingly, whilst the functional specialists are most interested in how they will be able to effectively coordinate their activities.

All of the above implies one simple notion - conflicts are likely to be ever present in strategic alliances. The essential question is:

How should managers deal with conflicts during the operational phase of the alliance?

The following provides a set of recommendations that may allow alliance managers to manage these thorny issues more effectively.

(1) Learn to deal with emotions effectively

If a partner has bamboozled you or has covertly tried to attain critical aspects of your technology, it is only natural that you will become angry and/or feel frustrated. Likewise, if your partner neglects to give you relevant or incomplete information, you may become anxious. It is likely that you will begin to suspect your partners intentions. Alternatively, if your partner fails to consult you on a decision, you may feel resentful about how you have been treated.

Emotions, such as anger, or anxiety, can have a strong impact both on how we behave and in how we perceive the actions of our counterpart. xviii For example, anger tempts aggressive behaviour, whilst anxiety impels us to withdraw from the situation. xix. It is not hard to imagine how the consequences of these emotions are likely to affect the evolution of the alliance. When one party acts aggressively, then the other may respond in a similar manner, thus escalating the conflict. Alternatively, if one of the parties seeks to retreat from the interaction, problems may remain unresolved and add fuel to the existing dissatisfaction and resentment.

The problem becomes infinitely more acute when the conflict occurs between alliance partners that come from different national cultures. In the case of American and Japanese negotiations it has often been noted that the Americans get aggressive while the Japanese seek to withdraw from the interaction. xx. This, in turn, enhances the Americans sense of frustration, causing increased aggressive behaviour and, in many cases, signals the demise of the interaction.

How, then, should managers manage their emotions in an emotionally charged situation? In many ways this is a complex issue, but let me offer several suggestions.

• Never express your emotions in an unconscious manner. In other words, do not permit the momentary situation to dictate the course of the events. In some situations it may be perfectly suitable to express anger, but even this must be expressed in a calm, purposeful way, with some clear objective in mind.
• Never be quick to judge the causes of the event(s) that have fuel your anger. Occasionally there may well be a legitimate basis why the partner behaved in the way that he/she did and that kindled your anger. It is vital that you probe the underlying reasons as to why this outcome has occurred before taking a final stance on the issue.
• Follow the principle of proportionality. Express your anger or frustration in relation to the nature of the original offence- but don't overreact.
• Finally, in international alliances, it is critical that you resolve these issues with the aid of a cultural mediator because the norms for dealing with emotions vary across cultures. xxi For example, in Confucian based cultures such as Japan or China, there is a strong taboo against overt expression of emotions. This may result in the parties losing face and the damage to the relationship may be severe.

(2) Do not allow problems to accumulate in the alliance

It is tempting to ignore the first signs of problems thinking that everything will turn out okay! While this may occasionally happen, the opposite can also be true. This is where problems multiply and smaller problems become larger problems. What may have been manageable at the beginning becomes much more problematic later! Essentially, when problems accumulate and are not addressed in a timely manner a number of things happen.

• First, the employees who are most directly impacted by these problems may come to believe they are not being taken seriously. This may cause feelings of injustice/resentment which could affect their morale in the alliance. xxii They may lower their level productivity and this is surely not good.
• Secondly, as the problems get put off, suspicion and rumour may take centre stage. Employees may speculate as to why management is not addressing these problems. Perhaps they are not that committed to the alliance after all! Alternatively, they may not be able to capably manage the alliance or they deliberately don't want a negative outcome to occur.
• Finally, an accumulation of minor problems may grow into major problems such as when the performance of the alliance falters, or one of the partners tries to withdraw from the partnership. A strategic alliance may be rescued even under these conditions but negotiating under these conditions is likely to be tough and time consuming. Needless to say, this is not the most efficient use of management time. It would much better, if through their commitment, the top management prevented the emergence of these problems in the first place.

(3) Be consistent

Consistency is a virtue because it creates the positive perception of predictability. When predictability is absent, trust is compromised. This is surely not positive for strengthening the relationship among the partners. xxiii. Consistency promotes the negotiation process and enhances conflict resolution because perceptions and reality in these cases are concurrent. Further, consistency can encourage planning and can assist the partners to implement their vision of the alliance with a maximum degree of perfection.

Consistency revolves around both goals and means. In other words, the partners must create and strengthen the perception that they are both trying to realize their stated goals. At the same time, the partners must also undertake initiatives that are consistent to achieve those objectives. For example, it would clearly be unhelpful if either partner erratically shifted their negotiating tactics- moving from a contending approach at the one extreme to a collaborative approach at the other spectrum.

Clearly, it may not always be possible to be perfectly consistent, but it should be a primary objective. Where consistency is breached, the partner(s) should strive to offer a coherent explanation as to why events turned out the way that they did, and they must do so in a timely means. Even in the event that one of the partners does not act consistently, it is not helpful if the other partner reciprocates this behaviour. If anything, the partner who has been acting consistently must endeavour to change its partner's behaviour.

(4) Finally, if nothing else works consider consultant intervention

Although this should not be the first option, it certainly deserves to be considered, especially if the parties have reached an impasse and cannot agree on the basis for the problem or how to manage the problem. The role of consultant is primarily one of a mediator who is trying to manage the issues of relationship and the interaction between the parties.

Consultants can play a role in defusing the emotional intensity of the conflict and offering creative solutions to help reconcile the interests of either party. They may also be instrumental in helping either party to save face and thus make the task of making concessions that much easier .xxiv Consultant interventions may be particularly useful when the partners come from different cultures and have difficulties in communicating and understanding each others intentions.

(c) Evaluating the strategic alliance

The success of a strategic alliance will be gauged by the degree to which it allows the partners to reach their goals. Although this exercise has merit it may often be difficult to implement. The simple reason is that in an ever evolving business and global climate the means to assess success or failure may not be easy to define. Contrarily, evaluation is important because it ultimately determines whether the alliance partners will seek to renegotiate the terms of their agreement, and if they do so, what specific negotiation strategies they will decide to pursue. The ultimate trick in evaluation is to determine or decide upon a certain benchmark to measure how the partnership is performing. It does not preclude the possibility of striking a new bargain with the alliance partner. In other words, this is also a phase in which ambiguity is likely to reign supreme.

In the following section we outline a few strategies that may enable the alliance partners to more effectively cope with ambiguity.

(1) Adopt a longer term horizon for evaluating the alliance

The more time that can be allotted to evaluating the alliance, then the higher the probability that the alliance may be able to achieve its objectives. We recognize that given the imperatives of global competition this may not always be an option. We also recognize that some alliances, are by definition, formed for a short period of time. That said, the point is that alliances will most likely experience a period of hiccups, unless of course the partner firms have become very adept in managing alliances. If the alliance partners jump to the conclusion that the alliance is not working, it may not be the most accurate one.

A longer term perspective permits the partners adequate time to get familiar with each others idiosyncrasies. In doing so there is the strong likelihood that they may be able to develop a common frame of reference for evaluating the partnership. A lengthy time horizon also guarantees that the partners are not unusually focused on immediate results at the cost of building an organization that may have greater viability over the longer term. Finally a longer time horizon lets the partners have more opportunity for experimenting with alternative ways in making the alliance more effective. It also needs to be stressed that with a " looming shadow over future" the alliance partners may also become more restrained in their approach in dealing with contentious issues.

(2) Assess the alliance performance in relation to your overall strategic goals

Alliances are formed for a broad variety of motives ranging from a marketing arrangement, to R&D partnerships, to market entry, just to name a few. Most often there may well be multiple objectives behind the creation of an alliance and this most certainly complicates matters. What is most important is that there needs to be an alignment between the overall objectives of the alliance and the process used to assess an alliance.

This sounds easy in theory but problems may occur in practice because there may be a disconnection in the objectives of upper management, alliance level managers, and functional specialists. This means that intra organizational negotiations are vital for alliance success as are negotiations between different alliance partners.

In many instances negotiating within the organization itself may be even more challenging than negotiating with an alliance partner. Past animosities, inter departmental rivalry may all contribute to the problem. These difficulties' not withstanding it is vital that intra organizational rivalries do not impede alliance performance.

Conclusion

This article proposes that negotiating alliances is most fundamentally an exercise in negotiating ambiguity. To some this may seem a paradox because how can one negotiate a thing whose essence is ambiguity? There view obviously has merit, but the fact remains that alliance managers interact in a context whose major defining feature is one of ambiguity. As we have sought to argue, while negotiating ambiguity is without doubt an exercise in resourceful management, and mandates a high degree of imagination, flexibility, and criticality, we have also made the argument that these attributes are essential for joint partner success.

Consider the case of Renault- Nissan alliance that has garnered considerable attention in recent years. xxv This alliance was established in 1999 when Reanault acquired a 36.8% stake in the company. Renault wanted to establish a stronger presence in Asia and in North America. Nissan, on the other hand was in financial difficulty and was looking for a saviour. Although both of the partner firms appeared to have matching goals, the cultural distance was large. It would require considerable effort and commitment on part of both firms to bridge this cultural divide. Initially, analysts were sceptical about how well the alliance would do. But as it turns out, the alliance has been successful. Careful preparation, cross cultural sensitivity, and the vital contribution of Carl Ghosn who led the new company all played a vital role. Carl Ghosn had a multicultural background (French mother and a Brazilian father), was fluent in five languages, and had graduated from Ecole Polytechnique, one of France's most prestigious institutions. His credentials were impeccable and he successfully won the confidence of his Japanese colleagues and made the alliance work.

This example serves to emphasize that alliances are complex social systems which require an approach that can help manage a complex arrangement. Although there are many aspects to complex management, the argument advanced here is that ambiguity management is clearly one vital ingredient. Ambiguity management presents distinct challenges for negotiators, and fundamentally requires that negotiators learn and act simultaneously. This may not be simple or for everyone but is crucial if the alliance is to do well.

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xvii ibid. xvi

xviii R.Kumar.(1997). The role of affect in negotiations: An overview. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 33: 84-100.

xix R.Lazarus.(1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press.

xx R.Kumar. (1999). Communicative conflict in intercultural negotiations: The case of American and Japanese business negotiations. International Negotiation Journal, 4:63-78.

xxi R.Kumar. (2004). Culture and emotions in intercultural negotiations. In M.J. Gelfand., & J.M. Brett (Eds.) The Handbook of negotiation and culture(pp.95-113). Stanford, CA: Stanford Business books.

xxii Ibid. viii.

xxiii J.K. Rempel., J.G. Holmes., & M.P. Zanna. (1985). Trust in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45:95-112.

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xxv M.Y. Yoshino., & P.L. Fagan. (2003). The Renault Nissan alliance. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.